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Abstract
This study examines changes in union contracts and wage structure
during and after the introduction of regulatory reforms (deregulation and
privatisation) in the Portuguese banking sector. The main finding is that,
despite a relative wage erosion detected in the contract data, banking
workers were able to enjoy an increasing wage premium in the period
1985-2000, probably reflecting the increasing profitability of the industry
and the rise in labour productivity. The evidence also shows that some
specific groups benefited relatively more than others: the least skilled and
educated workforce and male workers gained more from the regulatory
reforms. However, this unequal sharing of the wage premium did not
raise wage inequality across ownership groups in the industry.
Keywords: Deregulation, privatisation, wage structure, Portuguese bank-
ing industry
Jel classification: J31, J45, L33.
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1 Introduction
Regulatory reform of product markets is perhaps one of the most prominent
policies being undertaken in the European Union. Boosted by the establish-
ment of the single European market, numerous regulatory changes, which aim
to liberalise the provision of goods and services and enhance product market
competition, have been implemented over the last two decades. Yet the em-
pirical assessment of the impact of product market reform, relating to either
imposition or relaxation of constraints, on European labour market outcomes
has so far received little scrutiny.1
In contrast, the assessment of similar policies in the US has a long tradition.
Seminal work on regulation eﬀects date from the mid 1970s, whereas the ad-
vent of deregulation policies taking place primarily in the 1980s brought a new
flurry of studies covering most of the targeted industries and addressing diﬀer-
ent labour market issues.2 All these studies evaluate how (de)regulation policies
aﬀected distortions in the respective labour markets. More specifically, most of
the attention has been devoted to appraisals of labour earning responses to reg-
ulatory reforms. If there is rent-sharing between firms and unionised workers,
labour earnings are likely to be higher in regulated industries (regulated peri-
ods), where the degree of competition is lower. Thus, if rents allow high wages
in regulated industries (periods), then deregulation might be expected to nar-
row wage diﬀerentials. Nevertheless, diﬀerent regulatory experiences can lead
to diﬀerent labour earning eﬀects (Hendricks, 1994). For instance, Black and
Strahan (2001) find that in the US banking industry, male wages fell by 12.5 per
cent after the removal of restrictions on branching and interstate banking, while
Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) find that in the US air transportation industry,
trade unions were able to sustain a sizable wage premium, even twenty years
after the introduction of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978.
1One notable exception is Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) who examine the eﬀects of enacting
entry barriers in the French retail industry. Guadalupe (2005) looks at the eﬀects of increased
competition in the UK on wage inequality and return to skills.
2Hendricks (1977), Ehrenberg (1979) and Pergamit (1985) provide initial evidence on the
regulation eﬀects in several regulated sectors (transportation, communications public utilities)
while Ansar et al. (1997) and Hisch and Schumacher (1998) focus on the electricity and health
care sectors, respectively. The eﬀects of deregulation on labour outcomes have been extensively
examined in diﬀerent industries, encompassing airlines [Card (1986), Crémieux (1996), Hirsch
and Macpherson (2000)], trucking [Rose (1987), Peoples (1996, 1998), Belman and Monaco
(2001), Beltzer (1995), Monaco (2001), Monaco and Brooks (2001), Talley (2001)], railroad
[MacDonald and Cavalluzzo (1996), Davis and Wilson (1999)], electricity, [Nwaeze (2000),
McDermott (1999)], cable television [Crofton et al. (2000)] and banking [Black and Straham
(2001)]. For analyses of multiple sectors, see Hendricks (1994) or Peoples (1998, 2003).
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This paper contributes to the hitherto scarce literature on European regu-
latory reform by analysing the eﬀects of the deregulatory reforms in the Por-
tuguese banking sector. In line with the US literature, it also seeks to determine
the eﬀects of such reforms on the wage structure. More precisely, this study,
close to Hirsch and Macpherson’s (2000) work, examines how banking compen-
sation evolved over the transition between regulated and unregulated periods
and whether reforms aﬀected certain kind of workers diﬀerently.
The experience in the Portuguese banking industry, also labelled “valu-
able for other countries” since “the main reform objectives were met” without
“the concomitant financial instability experienced by many OECD countries”
(OECD, 1999, page 64), provides an important opportunity to analyse the ef-
fects of deregulatory reforms.
First, apart from its remarkable success, the Portuguese banking experience
may be considered somewhat more complex and challenging than any experience
formerly examined. In fact, in contrast with US cases, deregulatory reforms
targeted a completely public (and not private) regulated sector. Therefore,
there is an additional source of rent appropriation and the reforms’ diversity is
more extensive, comprising not only the common abolishment of both price and
entry barriers but also a privatisation program.
The present study also benefits from using richer data. The prototypical
American research on regulatory reforms examines individual level data from
the Current Population Survey. The Portuguese individual database, Quadros
de Pessoal, simultaneously accounts for both sides of the labour market, thereby
enabling us to control for firm-level characteristics. This helps overcoming some
drawbacks of earlier empirical research. Finally, the variety of variables available
in the dataset also allows us to shed further light on rent-sharing. In particular,
information about firms’ ownership helps to understand the dynamics of rent
appropriation in an industry with a changing ownership structure .
This study is structured as follows. In Section 2, an overview of the regula-
tory reform and the wage bargaining developments since the 1980s are presented.
Data and empirical specifications are addressed in Section 3. Section 4 presents
and discusses the results obtained. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
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2 Regulatory reforms and trade unions
The Portuguese banking industry has successively undergone tremendous trans-
formations during the last two decades. Prior to 1984, the industry was almost
exclusively composed of a small number of public firms which were overstaﬀed
and ineﬃcient, reflecting an activity severely limited by state control (OECD,
1999). Like in many OECD countries, credit and interest rate ceilings and other
capital controls governed daily banking operations. Furthermore, borrowing on
public debt was compulsory, which created an additional source for credit mis-
allocation. Entry barriers, either to new or already installed banks through
branch expansion, also contributed to the lack of competition and development
of the sector.
In 1984, the reversal of the regulated financial system started. The first three
legal actions (law 11/83 of 16th August, decree-law 406/83 of 19th November
and decree-law 51/84 of 11th February) opened the financial intermediation to
the private sector. At the same time, some of the deposit and borrowing interest
rates were liberalised. This process involved a cautious sequencing of step-by-
step measures which dismantled most of the regulatory instruments that directly
aﬀected the behaviour of firms. In 1992, the complete liberalisation process was
accomplished with the lifting of the remaining capital controls and barriers to
branch expansion.3
In the second phase, covering most of the 1990s, the full ownership of ten
out of twelve public banks was transferred to the private sector.4 This pri-
vatisation program (law 84/88 from 20th July and decree-law 11/90 from 5th
April), following two Constitutional Amendments, shared the common goals of
the worldwide privatisation processes: independence and improvement of public
banks’ performance and further enhancement of banking competition.
During the same period, conglomeration and technological innovations also
reshaped the industry. The conglomeration process — involving the formation
of groups (bancassurance) — took place mainly in the mid 90s, while the consol-
idation process — starting in 1998 with the merger of three recently privatised
banks — is still ongoing. The widespread use of new technologies, such as the
automated teller machines (ATM) and the electronic fund transfer at the point
of sale (EFTPS), also contributed to a reduction in time and costs associated
3OECD (1999) oﬀers a detailed and chronological description of all reform measures.
4More precisely one bank was privatised in 1989. We adopt this time partition because
in our empirical analysis, data in 1989 refers to public ownership status of the bank being
privatised, as it was collected before privatisation took place.
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with financial transactions.
Table 1: Banking industry size and performance, 1980-2000
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1997 1998-2000
Size and structure
Number of firms 17 27 36 43
Number of branches 1,425a) 1,577 3,075 4,646
Total employment (103) 58a) 59 61 56
Labour
Real productivityb) 1.231a) 1.360 2.367 4.164
Staﬀ costs/assets .014 .014 .012 .008
Profits (103 euros)
Profit per firm 3.31 7.37 23.04 39.82
Real profit per firmb) 16.33 14.64 27.22 38.73
Technology
ATM 519c) 3,184 29,147
EFTPOS 809c) 8,544 75,783
Source: Own computations based on OECD, Bank Profitability - Portugal, 1980-2000.
Notes: a) data relative to the period 1982-1984; b) 1998 prices; c) refers to 1989.
Table 1 displays some annual average figures that summarise the main changes
occurring in banking, in terms of size and performance, over the period 1980-
2000. As described previously, the period 1980-1984 corresponds to the regu-
lated era, the 1985-1989 corresponds to the phase of deregulation, the period
1990-1997 to the privatisation phase, and 1998-2000 to the recent consolidation
phase.
As a result of the abandonment of regulatory restrictions, competition and
eﬃciency of banking increased significantly (OECD, 1999). The reforms led to
a proliferation of firms and branches which fueled the demand for labour, es-
pecially for skilled employees. Consequently, employment grew, but at a much
slower pace, being sharply squeezed during the merger wave. Nevertheless, the
average size of firms was reduced dramatically over the period under scrutiny.
Labour productivity, measured by assets divided by employment, rose continu-
ously, reflecting the use of a more educated workforce combined with the wide-
spread use of new technology. This rise allowed a reduction in staﬀ costs, in
particular throughout the 1990s, from on average 1.4 per cent of total assets to
0.8 per cent. Profitability, measured by average real profits, declined during the
5
initial period of increased competition (1985-1989). In the remaining periods,
real profits increased markedly, reflecting the boom in the credit activity.
How did regulatory reforms aﬀect the wage bargaining in the industry? The
developments described previously conditioned the type of industrial labour re-
lations prevailing in banking, but did not aﬀect the bargaining process itself.
Covering three diﬀerent geographical areas, the oldest trade unions in the main-
land represent all employees, regardless the ownership of the bank. These trade
unions and a group of banks, public and now private (domestic or foreign),
meet each year to negotiate the collective bargaining agreement. This collective
agreement, the most detailed and extensive in Portugal, regulates the employ-
ability conditions, the remuneration and the duration of work. It also delimits
the starting wage level and the compulsory wage progressions for each of its 18
levels of the 4 groups defined to cover all the banking workforce.
Beyond this broad scope of the collective agreement, banking trade unions
also enjoy the strongest attachment in the economy. Between the periods 1974-
78 and 1991-95, average union density increased from 71% to 106% (Cerdeira,
1997).5 Despite this increased union density, banking unions did not contest the
new market environment to any significant extent. The resistance was limited,
not coordinated, mostly being made through internal speeches and pamphlets
which were rarely reported in the national press. The total number of strikes
was limited as well: five strikes occurred in 1986, 1988 and 1989, each involving
less than half of the total workforce (MSST, 1987-2001). More importantly,
the annual negotiated wage growth rate in banking has deteriorated after the
opening of the sector. Although it has declined for the whole economy as well,
accompanying the disinflation policy, the wage growth in the banking sector was
relatively lower from the 1990s onwards (Table 2).
Table 2: Collective bargaining contract data, 1980-2000
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1997 1998-2000
Total economy n.a. 12.1a) 8.0 3.4
Banking sector 19.1 13.0 7.2 3.2
Source: Own computations based on MSST, Relatórios e Análises. Regulamentação do trabalho and
on bargaining contract data supplied by Sindicato Bancário do Norte.
Notes: n.a. not available. a) refers to the 1986-1989 period
5The union density rate also includes retired employees, making a density rate in excess of
1 possible.
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3 Data and modelling
This study uses individual-level data from a particularly appropriate dataset
collected annually by the Portuguese Ministry for Social Security and Labour —
Quadros de Pessoal. This source covers all firms employing paid labour in Por-
tugal (including Azores and Madeira) and provides detailed information about
each unit, employee or firm, observed. For instance, the survey records informa-
tion on salaries, duration of work and on other characteristics of workers such
as gender, occupation, education, age and tenure. For firms, the survey records
information on ownership status, location, economic activity and firm size.
For our purpose, the major drawback of this data set is its unavailability
for years before 1985. It would be interesting to examine wages in the periods
before, during and after the regulatory reforms took place. Unfortunately, this
data limitation makes the present analysis confined to the period 1985-2000,
which nevertheless covers the period during and after the regulatory reforms
were implemented.
Following the usual practice in the deregulation literature, this study em-
ploys two strategies used in the work of Hirsch and Macpherson (2000). An
“adjusted hourly wage index” is constructed for the (total) banking industry
by estimating a log hourly wage regression, pooled over the period 1985-2000.
That is,
log HWAGEit =
X
βkXitk +
X
φyY EARity + it, (1)
where logHWAGEit is the logarithm of the gross hourly wage for individual
i in banking in year t. This variable is computed as the logarithm of the gross
monthly wage (obtained as the sum of the monthly base wage, plus regular
and irregular paid subsidies, payment indexed to tenure and overtime work)
divided by normal and extra hours worked, after being converted to real terms
(1998 prices), using the Consumer Price Index (IPC). Xitk includes variables
(indexed by k) measuring worker and firm attributes and βk are the correspond-
ing coeﬃcients (X0 equals unity and β0 is the intercept). Our control variables
include years of completed schooling, potential experience (age ÷ number of
years of schooling ÷ 6) and its square, tenure and its square, gender, gender-
experience interacted, gender-tenure interacted, six occupational categories, six
regional indicator variables, four regional indicator variables, firm size, three
ownership categories and three bargaining system indicators.6 Y EAR is a set
6We also tried to control for the eﬀect of market concentration on banking wages. However,
since the HHI is relatively stable in the period 1985-2000, varying between 0.073 and 0.123,
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of fourteen time dummy variables (indexed by y) for the period 1985-2000 and
it is an error assumed to have zero mean and constant variance.7 The “ad-
justed hourly wage index” is constructed from the Y EAR dummy coeﬃcients
φy. These measure the logarithmic hourly wage diﬀerentials relative to the base
year 1985. To obtain the percentage index, the coeﬃcients are converted by
100× £exp ¡φy¢− 1¤+100, with 1985 = 100. The “adjusted hourly wage index”
is based on all banking workers in the period 1985-2000. After dropping ob-
servations with incomplete demographic information we ended up with 692 133
banking workers.
The banking wage structure is also allowed to vary by year and to be
economy-wide determined. Annual measures of the “adjusted hourly wage dif-
ferential or premium” are computed for the banking relative to the entire labour
force, after controlling for worker and firms attributes. The analysis is based on
two random samples of 10 per cent of workers from the banking and nonbanking
sectors extracted for each year in the period 1985-2000 (drawn after dropping
observations with incomplete demographic information).8 These samples cor-
respond, on average, to 4 600 (117 360) employees per year in the banking
(nonbanking) sector over the period under scrutiny. The following specification
is then estimated for each year t :
log HWAGEit =
X
βkXitk + δtBANKit + it, (2)
where i stands for employee i, t is year, k indexes the same worker and firm con-
trol variables in Xitk, βk represents the corresponding coeﬃcients and BANK
is a single binary variable for banking employment. The relative wage premium
for banking is given in each year t by [exp(δt)− 1]× 100.
The pay-wage scale defined in the banking wage agreement is extremely com-
pressed. For example, a top grade occupation earns at most six times as much
as the lowest-grade occupation worker (level 18 versus level 1of the agreement
contract). This same ratio reaches 5 in central planned economies and 20 in the
US (Brainerd, 2000). Therefore, we also explore if the banking wage premium
varies over the wage distribution. We estimate equation (2) using quantile re-
gression techniques due to Koenker and Basset (1978). The quantile regression
gives the θth quantile, with θ ∈ (0, 1) of the distribution of log HWAGEit
identification is not possible.
7Data are missing in 1990.
8These random samples were stratified proportionaly according to economic activity, own-
ership status and firm size.
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given Xitk and BANK. Estimation is here restricted to five values of θ: 0.10,
0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90. The following estimation uses the ‘sqreg’ command in
STATA 8 and bootstrapped standard errors repeated 20 times.
In all equations, the analysis includes exclusively full time employees aged
between 18 and 65 years according to the definition of the collective agreement
in the industry.
Table 3 provides descriptive evidence on earnings and on selected individual
attributes in the banking and nonbanking sectors, averaged over the previous
periods based on calculations from the two random samples.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on banking and nonbanking workers, 1985-2000
1985-1989 1990-1997 1998-2000
Banking sector
log of hourly wage 7.11 7.44 7.58
Male (%) 76.3 71.9 65.5
Schooling∗ 9.1 10.3 11.6
Age∗ 39.8 41.0 40.2
Tenure∗ 13.3 14.2 13.4
Nonbanking sector
log of hourly wage 6.16 6.43 6.57
Male (%) 68.1 63.3 60.9
Schooling∗ 5.2 6.3 7.2
Age∗ 35.6 35.6 36.2
Tenure∗ 9.3 8.2 7.7
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1985-2000)
* Reported in years.
Labour earning figures indicate that both banking and nonbanking employ-
ees experienced a strong (real 1998 PTE) hourly wage rise over the period
considered, mainly reflecting the fast economic growth in the economy after the
membership of Portugal in the EU.9 Indeed, labour earnings rose on average
47% and 41% from 1985-1989 to 1998-2000 for banking and nonbanking work-
ers, respectively. Nevertheless, banking pays a substantially higher hourly wage
than the rest of the economy, reflecting the use of a much more educated, older
and more experienced workforce. For instance, the average number of schooling
years in banking is in 1985-1989 (1998-2000) 9.1 (11.6) years, while in the rest of
the economy it is only 5.2 (7.2) years. Age and tenure numbers show that bank-
ing employees typically experience longer careers in the same firm compared to
9Unit of currency = escudos (PTE). 1 Euro = 200.482 PTE
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nonbanking employees.10 As Lazear (1995) suggests, the use of seniority-based
wage scales creates self-enforcing contracts that promote incentives for workers
to supply high eﬀorts throughout their careers and remain in the job. Striking
diﬀerences also emerge in terms of the composition of the workforce in the two
labour markets. The banking sector is still a male dominated sector, although
the proportion of women employed has increased relatively more (10 percent-
age points) than in the rest of the economy between the periods 1985-1989 and
1998-2000.
4 Empirical results
The “adjusted hourly wage index” and the “relative hourly wage diﬀerential”
are shown in Figure 1 and Table 4.
Table 4: Adjusted hourly wage index and relative hourly wage diﬀerentials,
1985-2000
Year Hourly wage index Hourly wage diﬀerential
OLS .10 .25 .50 .75 .90
1985 100 .22 .39 .32 .24 .15 .13
1986 106 .29 .44 .39 .32 .22 .10
1987 113 .28 .40 .36 .30 .23 .16
1988 109 .28 .40 .37 .31 .23 .18
1989 108 .22 .36 .32 .27 .18 .10
1991 122 .23 .36 .34 .28 .18 .09
1992 146 .37 .45 .42 .39 .38 .35
1993 137 .27 .41 .36 .29 .24 .18
1994 150 .34 .46 .41 .37 .31 .28
1995 147 .30 .50 .42 .32 .24 .17
1996 137 .27 .46 .39 .31 .23 .12
1997 138 .23 .46 .37 .26 .17 .04
1998 148 .27 .48 .40 .31 .22 .10
1999 157 .33 .55 .46 .38 .27 .17
2000 151 .30 .53 .44 .34 .24 .15
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1985-2000)
All coeﬃcients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
Both measures display a similar trend during and after the reforms were
introduced. The adjusted hourly wage index in 2000 implies an average increase
of 2.8% per year, while the relative hourly wage premium rose from 0.22 log
10Seltzer and Merrett (2000) and Seltzer and Simons (2001) provide similar evidence on the
long-lasting careers of Australian banking employees.
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Figure 1: Adjusted and relative banking labour earnings, 1985-2000
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points in 1985 to 0.30 log points in 2000. Nevertheless, both wage trends exhibit
considerable fluctuation, a pattern also detected in the US railroad industry (see
Peoples, 1998 and MacDonald and Cavalluzo, 1996) 11 Despite this, there is a
discernible positive trend: average wage diﬀerential grew from 0.26 log points in
the period 1985-1989 to 0.29 and 0.30 log points in the periods 1990-1997 and
1998-2000.
Part of this fluctuation trend is explained by changes in the market ownership
structure, brought about by the arrival of new high paying firms, either domestic
or foreign, as we will show later. However, the growth in the banking wage
premium is most likely to be mirroring the financial health of the sector. As
seen previously, reforms are associated with substantial improvements in labour
productivity and profits, and, later on, with reductions in employment. Thus,
when seen in conjunction with Table 1, our results are compatible with a rent-
sharing based explanation.
How can we conciliate the upward trend in the wage premium with the
worsening of the bargained wage outcome over the nineties? In this sector, the
bargained wage works as a wage floor and firms are free to set wages above the
negotiated benchmark according to their specific conditions. In addition, the
wage drift, the diﬀerential between the wage defined by the collective agreement
11This fluctuation also indicates the potential fallacies of analyses which consider only two
points in time, one before and another after, the reforms.
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Figure 2: Banking hourly wage diﬀerentials over five percentiles, 1985-2000.
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and the actual wage paid, has increased since the early nineties (Aperta et al.,
1994) and is the second highest in 1999 among 16 industries in Portugal (Cardoso
and Portugal, 2005).
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the hourly wage premium may be overes-
timated. First, as referred in the press, banking has been under scrutiny by
Inspecção Geral do Trabalho for misreporting the overtime work.12 Thus, if
workers have been working more hours than those reported, then the hourly
wage premium is actually overvalued. Another shortcoming may result from
the eﬀective control of the firms size. Although, we control directly for the size
of each bank (through the logarithm of employment), the actual size might be
undervalued, as banking firms started creating conglomerate groups, within and
outside banking. Thus, the actual firm size eﬀect, which is associated economy-
wide with high wages, is not fully controlled.
Figure 2 shows, alternatively, the wage diﬀerential over five selected per-
centiles of the wage distribution. The wage premium at all percentiles of the
wage distribution broadly replicates the pattern previously identified (mean
wage diﬀerential) over the period under scrutiny. Furthermore, the wage pre-
mium, despite being pervasive, is an inverse and monotone function of the per-
centiles of the wage distribution. Indeed, less-skilled workers have been enjoy-
ing substantially higher gains while highly-skilled workers have been benefiting
12See Público, 12th of November of 2003, and Expresso, the main daily and weekly Por-
tuguese newspapers, respectively.
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from much more modest gains. Moreover, this left skewed premium distribu-
tion, typical for public labour markets, appears unchanged/preserved over time,
even after the tremendous ownership changes which occurred in the industry.
The shape of the wage premium distribution also reflects the generous wage-
promotion policy implicit in the wage agreement contract. The wage agreement
imposes automatic and compulsory merit promotions for a minimum contingent
in each group of the lowest educational levels (between level 1 and 10), while
these are optional for upward educational levels (clause 18 and 19, respectively,
of the wage agreement).
A closer look to specific groups
Table 5 explores some sources of variation in the relative hourly wage of
banking during the period 1985-2000. The first three columns of Table 5 show
the coeﬃcients obtained by estimation model (2), where binary banking employ-
ment is interacted with two ownership dummies. The last two columns show
the coeﬃcients of the same model where the dummy variable is interacted with
gender.
Table 5: Relative hourly wage diﬀerential in specic groups
Year Ownership Gender
Public Private Foreign Female Male
1985 .24 .85 .18 .21
1986 .30 .81 .14 .24 .29
1987 .30 .81 .75 .24 .28
1988 .28 .61 .79 .22 .28
1989 .22 .63 .73 .19 .24
1991 .14 .39 .63 .16 .26
1992 .41 .26 .80 .32 .39
1993 .18 .32 .78 .20 .31
1994 .23 .39 .57 .28 .38
1995 .32 .30 .54 .25 .33
1996 .20 .27 .52 .22 .31
1997 .20 .23 .34 .19 .25
1998 .16 .27 .35 .23 .30
1999 .23 .33 .40 .29 .36
2000 .38 .30 .29 .27 .32
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1985-2000)
All coeﬃcients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
Immediately after the opening of the sector in 1984, the banking wage pre-
mium rose. As Figure 2 shows, this rise is induced by the start-up of new firms,
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Figure 3: Banking hourly wage diﬀerential by firm ownership, 1985-2000
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both domestic and foreign. To oﬀset riskier jobs, these firms rewarded their
workforce considerably better than the already installed public firms.13 In the
subsequent period, the movement in the wage premium in domestic firms re-
flects the privatisation program, which led to temporary reductions in wages
during the first and second years after its introduction (Monteiro, 2004). Thus,
the wage premium in private domestic firms declined substantially in 1991 and
1992, and after 1994, as the two largest firm privatisations’ occurred in 1989
and 1994, and one bank was privatised in each of the years 1990, 1992, 1993
and 1996. In this same period, the increasingly competitive environment in
the sector led to a substantial reduction of the wage premium in foreign firms.
By the end of the period, the wage premium tends to converge across banking
ownership groups in accordance with the bargaining system prevailing in the
industry.
In terms of gender, regulatory reforms seem to have benefited men in partic-
ular. Average male wage premium went up from 0.26 in the period 1985-1989
to 0.32 log points in the period 1998-2000, while for women wages went up from
0.21 to 0.26 log points in the same time periods. Thus, in contrast with the
deregulatory experience in the US banking industry (Black and Strahan, 2001)
and in the motor bus industry (Schwarz-Miller and Tally, 2000), our estimation
results do not support the theoretical expectations of the Becker hypothesis: as
13See also Barros and Pinho (2003).
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discrimination becomes more costly to sustain in competitive markets, gender
wage gap should be gradually eliminated.
Wage dispersion
We now focus on whether regulatory reforms lead to increased wage disper-
sion in banking. Table 6 below, presents averages of various measures of wage
dispersion across banking ownership groups over the periods described before.
We examine inequality measures for both the unconditional and conditional log
of hourly wage. The conditional log of hourly wage is defined as the residuals
of the equation (1) estimated separately per year and sector.14
Table 6: Wage dispersion in banking and nonbanking sectors
Banking Nonbanking
Unconditional Conditional Unc. Cond.
All Pub. Priv. For. All Pub. Priv. For. All All
1985-1989
90-10 .832 .800 1.270 1.360 .488 .476 .660 .947 1.307 .686
90-50 .513 .483 .775 .524 .303 .297 .265 .340 .904 .398
50-10 .319 .316 .495 .836 .185 .179 .395 .607 .403 .288
variance .113 .104 .222 .274 .046 .043 .082 .154 .240 .093
1990-1997
90-10 .950 .818 .938 1.344 .582 .525 .576 .816 1.348 .789
90-50 .604 .495 .600 .752 .316 .266 .331 .440 .931 .457
50-10 .346 .323 .338 .592 .266 .259 .245 .377 .417 .333
variance .155 .125 .152 .285 .064 .052 .062 .148 .305 .127
1998-2000
90-10 .930 .795 .977 .919 .511 .477 .516 .586 1.317 .813
90-50 .550 .490 .599 .511 .261 .236 .284 .227 .882 .472
50-10 .380 .305 .378 .408 .250 .241 .233 .359 .435 .341
variance .151 .117 .164 .143 .055 .048 .057 .069 .295 .123
Source: Own computations based on QP, MSST (1985-2000).
Both (un)conditional measures indicate that the pattern of wage dispersion
prevailing in banking is similar to that found in the economy over the entire
period. Thus, wage inequality is pronounced at the top of the wage distribution
while at the bottom it is relatively compressed. However, the level of wage
14The determination of (un)conditional inequality measures is popular in this literature.
For example, Disney and Gosling (1998) and Hirsch and Macpherson (2000), among others,
applied it.
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dispersion is substantially lower (as expected from the wage scale defined in the
collective agreement) in banking in each of the three periods considered. In
particular, public firms, as opposed to privately owned firms (both national and
foreign), present the most egalitarian pay policy.
In terms of trend, the wage dispersion of banking followed the rest of the
economy. For instance, (unconditional) variances in banking wages grew from
.11 in 1985-1989, to .16 in 1991-1997, to .15 in 1998-2000, while economy-wide
variances grew at the same pace, from .24 to .31 to .30. Nevertheless, the
wage dispersion declined remarkably in foreign banks. For instance, the average
conditional gap 90-10 dropped from .95 in 1985-1989, to .82 in 1990-1997, to .59
in 1998-2000, while in private (public) firms, it went from .66 (.48) to .58 (.53)
to .52 (.48) in the same periods. This indicates that the privatisation reform
did not lead to increased wage inequality. Thus, contrary to our expectations
and previous findings (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000 and Guadalupe, 2005), the
evidence shown here, either in level or in trend, does not confirm the hypothesis
that regulatory reforms, in themselves, contribute to a rise in wage inequality.
5 Conclusion
Despite the worldwide implementation of regulatory reforms in product mar-
kets, the examination of the impacts on European labour outcomes has been
relatively scarce. This study helps to narrow this particular gap in the regula-
tion literature by addressing the eﬀects of such reforms in the wage structure of
the Portuguese banking sector. The Portuguese banking experience provides a
notable case study as, unlike former US evidence, it targeted a public regulated
sector. Therefore, the regulatory reforms are diversified, including not only the
removal of price and entry controls, but also a privatisation program.
This study examines changes in union wage contracts and in the banking
wage premium over the period of regulatory reforms, using data collected di-
rectly from banking unions and from Quadros de Pessoal in the period 1985-
2000. The main finding is that, despite a relative drop in the contracted wages
(serving as a wage ‘floor’), regulatory reforms, either deregulation or privati-
sation, in general did not harm employees. Instead, despite the fluctuation,
banking workers were able to enjoy an increasing wage premium. A notable ex-
ception are the workers from foreign firms who saw their above-average salaries
declining during the period 1985-2000. The evidence also shows that some spe-
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cific groups benefited relatively more than others. The least skilled and educated
workforce, as well as male workers, gained more from the regulatory reforms.
This finding contradicts the predictions from the standard discrimination the-
ory of Becker (1957). However, surprisingly, this unequal sharing of the wage
premium did not contribute to the rise in banking wage inequality. In particu-
lar, neither deregulation nor privatisation raised wage inequality across banking
ownership groups.
The upward trend in the banking wage premium is probability associated
with the increase in profitability and labour productivity observed in the indus-
try between 1985 and 2000. A more direct rent-sharing test, relating wages to
profits across diﬀerent ownership groups, would help us to be more conclusive
about the causes of our findings. This, however, is left for future research.
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